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I. INTRODUCTION
Dan Ross died in 1990 at the age of 46 after a long and painful fight with brain
cancer.1 For decades, Dan worked at the Conoco Chemical and Condea Vista plant
in Louisiana in a job that repeatedly exposed him to the dangerous chemical vinyl
chloride.2 Convinced that this exposure caused Dan’s terminal brain cancer, Dan’s
wife, Elaine, filed a wrongful death action against his employer.3 Documents
produced during discovery prior to settlement of the case revealed that the chemical
industry had known for decades that its products could be harmful to its employees.4
1

Chemical Industry Archives, In Memory of Dan Ross (1944 to 1990),
http://www.chemicalindustryarchives.com/about/dedication.asp (last visited Sept.. 24, 2005)
[hereinafter Dan Ross]. This website provides a dedication to the memory of Dan Ross by
publishing an archive of chemical industry documents that were revealed during the discovery
phase of the wrongful death suit his wife brought against Conoco (now Vista). The website
also provides general information about the chemical industry in America and dangerous
chemicals that workers may be exposed to in the workplace.
2
Id. Vinyl chloride is a dangerous reality for chemical workers who are exposed to it on a
daily basis; exposure causes disintegration of finger bones, fatal liver cancers, and other types
of cancers. Chemical Industry Archives, The Inside Story: Vinyl Chloride,
http://www.chemicalindustryarchives.com/dirtysecrets/vinyl/1.asp (last visited Sept. 24, 2005)
[hereinafter Vinyl Chloride]. As early as 1959, a Dow scientist concluded “we feel quite
confident . . . that 500 ppm [of vinyl chloride] is going to produce rather appreciable injury
when inhaled 7 hours a day, five days a week for an extended period.” Id. The Conoco plant
where Dan Ross worked is located in Louisiana, which, as of 1998, was the third ranked state
in highest vinyl chloride emissions. Id. Louisiana has ten facilities, which emitted over
125,000 pounds of vinyl chloride emissions in 1998. Id.
3

Dan Ross, supra note 1.

4

Id. Although Elaine Ross settled her suit against Conoco, she allowed her lawyer,
William Baggett, Jr., to bring a separate suit against companies and trade associations in the
American Chemistry Council. Id. This latter suit alleged that companies “conspired to
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For many years, the chemical industry has tried to conceal knowledge of product
dangers from its employees, consumers, and the general public, all to the detriment
of workers’ safety.5 The actions of the chemical industry exemplify why employees
need to have increased access to information concerning workplace safety risks and
an effective channel for addressing workplace safety issues and injuries. Currently,
when chemical workers like Dan Ross suffer workplace injuries, they look to
legislation and litigation for relief, neither of which provides a complete solution to
the problem of workplace safety. I propose an alternative vehicle—employee board
representation in the chemical industry—that will provide workers at risk for
chemical exposure injuries6 access to vital safety information and a forum for
advocating improved workplace safety.
In Part II of this note, I analyze the impact of tort litigation, workers’
compensation, collective bargaining, and the Occupational Safety and Health Act on
workplace safety. I begin by describing how each of these vehicles operated
historically and then I provide a contemporary perspective. In this section, I also
consider the advantages and disadvantages of using these approaches to prevent and
compensate for injuries. In Part III, I propose an alternative approach to workplace
withhold crucial information about dangers of vinyl chloride from workers, government
regulators, and the public.” Id. Baggett later filed three other such conspiracy suits; all four
suits are still in the process of adjudication. Id.
5

Vinyl Chloride, supra note 2 (explaining that although the chemical industry began
discovering the many dangers of vinyl chloride over thirty years ago, it continued to withhold
that information from unknowing workers, who are still dying from overexposure).
6
Workers in the chemical industry are exposed to harmful chemicals daily, putting them at
continuous risk of developing occupational injuries and illnesses from chemical exposure.
The harm that these workers may experience depends on the intensity and length of exposure,
as well as the worker’s “own individual susceptibility.” Francis H. Miller, Biological
Monitoring: The Employer’s Dilemma, 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 387, 389 (1984). Although the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration issues standards for the levels of exposure
permitted for chemicals in the workplace, it is unable to keep pace with the thousands of
chemicals handled by chemical workers each year. Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O.
McGarity, Reorienting OSHA: Regulatory Alternatives and Legislative Reform, 6 YALE J. ON
REG. 1, 2 (1989). New information is constantly being discovered relating to safe exposure
levels and unknown potential affects. In fact, recent studies have revealed that although U.S.
occupational guidelines limit exposure for the chemical benzene, one of the most commonly
used chemicals in the industry, to one part per million, even lower amounts may be harmful to
those exposed. Benzene Causes Lowered Blood Cell Counts in Workers Exposed at Low
Levels, STATE NEWS SERV., Dec. 2, 2004. As explained by Dr. David A. Estmond, professor
of environmental toxicology at the University of California, “These results clearly indicate
that the current OSHA permissible exposure limit is not sufficiently protective of worker
health.” Andrew C. Revkin, Broad Study Suggests a Lower Tolerance for Exposure to
Benzene, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2004, at A20.
The case of hexavalent chromium provides another example of an OSHA standard lagging
behind actual present day exposure risks of a certain chemical. U.S. Centers for Disease
Control & Prevention; Lung Cancer Risk from Hexavalent Chromium Exposure Assessed,
LAB BUS. WEEK, February 20, 2005, available at LEXIS, News, Most Recent Two Years.
Hexavalent chromium is used in the chromate industry and poses risks to workers when they
are exposed to hexavalent-chromium-containing dusts and mists. Id. A recent scientific study
reveals, “current occupational standards for hexavalent chromium permit a lifetime excess risk
of dying of lung cancer that exceeds 1 in 10.” Id.
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safety: employee board representation. In this section, I analyze and critique various
methods of employee board representation and ultimately recommend a form of
representation in which an outside professional hired to represent worker safety
issues serves on the board of directors. I advocate this model as an effective means
for providing workers in the chemical industry with critical safety information and a
channel for improving workplace safety.
II. ADDRESSING WORKPLACE SAFETY ISSUES IN AMERICA
A. Tort Litigation
1. Historically
Before legislatures enacted workers’ compensation statutes around 1910, workers
such as Dan Ross relied solely on tort suits to recover for workplace injuries.7 Tort
suits were based on a system of common law negligence liability.8 Under the
negligence system, an employer was held liable for a worker’s injury when the
employer was found to be at fault for the injury.9 The potential success of tort claims
rose with the expansion of the doctrine of respondeat superior. Under the expanded
doctrine of respondeat superior, employers became liable in tort for injuries
occurring in the course of employment and caused by the negligence of any one of
their employees.10
However, the doctrines of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk
limited workers’ ability to recover against their employers in tort suits for workplace
injuries.11 If the injured worker was determined to have been negligent in any way,
the doctrine of contributory negligence completely barred recovery.12 Recovery was
also barred under the doctrine of assumption of the risk if the suit involved a risk of
employment of which the worker either reasonably knew or could have been
expected to know.13
Not surprisingly, most workers who brought tort suits against their employers for
workplace injuries were unable to recover damages.14 One employment law scholar
has estimated that a maximum of only thirteen percent of workers ever recovered for

7

STEVEN L. WILLBORN
2002).

ET AL.,

EMPLOYMENT LAW CASES

AND

MATERIALS 892 (3d ed.

8

PRICE V. FISHBACK & SHAWN EVERETT KANTOR, A PRELUDE TO THE WELFARE STATE: THE
ORIGINS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 28-29 (2000).
9

Id.

10

MATTHEW BENDER, 20-96 PERSONAL INJURY—ACTIONS, DEFENSES, DAMAGES § 2.02
(2004), LEXIS, Matthew Bender(R), By Area of Law.
11

WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 892.

12

Id. The doctrine of contributory negligence barred recovery even if the worker was
determined to be one percent at fault for his injuries and the employer was determined to be
ninety-nine percent at fault for the worker’s injuries. Id.
13

Id.

14

Id.
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their workplace injuries in tort suits, although more than seventy percent of their
injuries were likely attributable to working conditions or employer negligence.15
2. Contemporary Tort Litigation
Although the doctrines of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk
have almost disappeared, workers’ compensation laws have restricted the settings in
which employees can bring tort suits. One of the key features of workers’
compensation is exclusivity, meaning that when an injury falls under the applicable
workers’ compensation statute, workers’ compensation is the exclusive remedy
available against an employer..16 Because injuries and illnesses resulting from
workplace accidents fall under workers’ compensation, the exclusion provision
prevents almost all workers from filing tort suits against their employers.17
There are a few noted exceptions to the exclusivity doctrine, the most relevant to
this note being an exception for intentional torts.18 Although states word their
intentional tort exceptions differently, this exception typically applies when an
employer intentionally caused the employee’s workplace injury or took action with
knowledge that the injury was certain or substantially certain to result.19 Proving an
intentional tort is a higher burden than proving traditional negligence (pre-workers’
compensation) because employees must prove their employers acted with intent, not
simply that they acted without due care.20 This burden makes recovery for
workplace injuries under present-day tort suits even more difficult than under preworkers’ compensation tort suits.
3. Advantages of the Contemporary Tort System
One advantage of the current tort system is that tort suits function as a vehicle for
employees to obtain safety information through discovery. In tort suits, parties
participate in a lengthy discovery process21 that involves the exchange of significant
15

Id.

16

CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT 1267 (1993).

17

WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 903.

18
Other exceptions to the exclusivity doctrine include dual injury and bad faith. Joan T.A.
Gabel et al., The New Relationship Between Injured Worker and Employer: An Opportunity
for Restructuring the System, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 403, 409-10 (1998). Dual injury occurs when
an employee who has already suffered a workplace injury is deceived by her employer and
this deception causes the employee to experience additional or aggravated injury. WILLBORN
ET AL., supra note 7, at 974. Bad faith refers to employer fraud in defending a workers’
compensation claim. Id. at 975.
It is also important to note that tort suits against third parties are not barred by the
exclusivity provision of workers’ compensation. Id. at 985. Injured workers may sue
manufacturers of the machinery or products that caused their injuries under product liability
theories. Id. In a few states, workers may also sue their employers’ insurance carriers for
“negligent inspection of the workplace or negligent medical care.” Id. at 986.
19

27 AM. JUR. 2d § 203 (2005). See also Gabel et al., supra note 18. In some instances,
an employer’s conduct may be so egregious that intent may be inferred. Id.
20

Gabel et al., supra note 18, at 409-10.

21

Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits of
Judicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1701 (1992).
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amounts of company information, thus reducing the information gap between
workers and their employers. During discovery, plaintiff workers obtain access to
critical information concerning workplace dangers, safety measures, and employer
actions. As exemplified in Dan Ross’s story, this information can help to reveal
workplace hazards to which workers are unknowingly exposed.22 In turn, this
information can be used to lobby employers to reduce these workplace hazards.
Another advantage of the current tort system is that when a worker plaintiff is
successful, she can obtain full recovery for her injuries as long as her losses do not
exceed any caps on awards imposed by the particular jurisdiction. Unlike workers’
compensation, the tort system allows recovery for all economic and noneconomic
losses,23 thus providing the most complete compensation available for workplace
injuries.
4. Disadvantages of the Contemporary Tort System
Tort suits are not effective at compensating for workplace injuries, however,
because plaintiff workers are rarely able to overcome the exclusion provisions and,
even when they do, there is no guarantee they will win or fully recover their losses.
As I explained previously, achieving a successful outcome for workplace injuries
under the present-day tort system is difficult because most injuries are governed by
workers’ compensation24 or require the plaintiff to prove that the employer acted with
intent,25 which is a high burden of proof. Even if the plaintiff satisfies the required
elements for employer liability, recovery is not automatic when the claims fall
outside workers’ compensation.26 The plaintiff must go through a lengthy legal
process27 and convince a jury that the employer is liable and that the plaintiff is
entitled to the full amount of her damages.28
The jury may grant a damage award lower than the plaintiff’s actual losses.
Likewise, under the doctrine of comparative negligence, recovery can be reduced if
the employee is partially at fault for the injury.29 Where states place caps on awards,
22

Dan Ross, supra note 1.

23

SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 1266.

24

WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 903.

25

Gabel et al., supra note 18, at 409-10.

26

See generally WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7.

27
SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 1272. The time between filing a tort action and trial
can range from fifteen to twenty months. Id. (citing Theodore F. Haas, On Reintegrating
Workers’ Compensation and Employers’ Liability, 21 GA. L. REV. 843, 847 (1987)). The
delay caused by tort suits often causes worker plaintiffs “to accept low settlements rather than
face the uncertainty of lengthy litigation.” Frances L. Edwards, Worker Right-to-Known Laws:
Ineffectiveness of Current Policy-Making and a Proposed Legislative Solution, 15 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1987).
28

MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW
MATERIALS 114 (7th ed. 2001).

AND

ALTERNATIVES, CASES

AND

29
SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 1266. See also FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 28, at
440. Under comparative negligence, the plaintiff’s recovery is reduced depending on the
degree of the plaintiff’s negligence compared to the defendant’s negligence. Id.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol53/iss3/8

6

2005-06]

RETHINKING AMERICA’S APPROACH

519

the caps can prevent a plaintiff from obtaining full recovery if her losses exceed the
ceiling.30
A further limitation persists in tort systems because tort suits alone do not
provide sufficient incentives for employers to improve workplace safety. Absent
other incentives, employers may choose simply to ignore tort litigation and
workplace safety where the threat of successful tort litigation is minimal. As long as
the employers pay out less in tort damages to injured employees than the cost of
improved safety measures that would prevent such injuries, the employer has a cost
incentive not to improve workplace safety.31
B. Workers’ Compensation
The failure of tort suits to supply employees with an adequate remedy for
workplace injuries generated a national push for another form of compensation for
employee injuries: statutory workers’ compensation.32 In 1908, Theodore Roosevelt
successfully pressed for passage of the first workers’ compensation statute in the
United States, which covered specific federal employees.33 In 1910, New York
enacted the first state workers’ compensation act.34 By 1948, workers’ compensation
statutes existed in every state in the United States.35
1. Historically
The purpose of the early state workers’ compensation statutes was to provide
employers with limited liability and employees with more certain recovery for
workplace injuries36 by altering liability for workplace injuries from negligence to
strict liability.37 The workers’ compensation system operated as a no-fault system in
which employers were required to insure against workplace injuries and employees
were automatically provided with compensation for workplace injuries, regardless of
the employer’s fault.38 Workers’ compensation worked much like a contract between
workers and their employers in which workers gave up their rights to sue in return
30

FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 28, at 695.

31

Of course, there are many other factors, such as business reputation and employee
morale, which exist outside the threat of tort suits that may provide incentives for employers to
improve workplace safety.
32

WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 894.

33

Id.

34

Id. at 895. The New York act was held unconstitutional in Ives v. S. Buffalo Railway
Company, 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911) on due process grounds. WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7,
at 895. After the act was struck down, “‘fear of unconstitutionality impelled the legislatures to
pass over the ideal type of coverage, which would be both comprehensive and compulsory, in
favor of more awkward and fragmentary plans’. . .. By the time the U.S. Supreme Court held
in 1917 that compulsory compensation laws were constitutional, the pattern of elective statutes
had been set.” Id.
35

Id.

36

Id. at 900.

37

FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 8, at 29-30.

38

See generally SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 16.
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for access to certain benefits when they suffered a workplace injury.39 Workers
favored workers’ compensation because they no longer had to bear the burden of
workplace injuries.40 Instead, they automatically received some compensation for
their injuries. Employers favored workers’ compensation because it eliminated the
uncertainty employers faced concerning unbounded tortious liability for workplace
injuries, especially those outside their control.41
The early workers’ compensation system was not without weaknesses.
Originally, compensation was limited to industrial “accidents.”42 This limitation
engendered confusion concerning exactly what injuries or accidents were covered.43
In addition, early state statutes provided narrow coverage, usually only applying to
specific hazardous industries, which employed less than half of the workforce.44
Occupational diseases were not expressly included in state workers’ compensation
acts, which sometimes precluded employees from recovering for such diseases.45
Overall, the workers’ compensation system was criticized for being inadequate and
unfair.46
2. The Contemporary Workers’ Compensation System
The weaknesses of the workers’ compensation system spurred the National
Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws (National Commission) to
push for an improved workers’ compensation system.47 The National Commission
pressed for a program that would provide “(1) broad coverage of employees and
work-related injuries and diseases; (2) substantial protection against interruption of
39

Id. at 309.

40

Id. at 310. Before workers’ compensation statutes were enacted, workers bore a much
higher burden for workplace injuries. First, workers were unable to obtain full insurance
coverage, relying on savings and other household means of insurance against workplace injury
risk. Id. Workers’ compensation alleviated this burden on workers by requiring employers to
purchase insurance providing their entire labor force with injury benefits exceeding those
available under the tort system. Price V. Fishback & Shawn E. Kantor, The Adoption of
Workers’ Compensation in the United States, 1900-1930, 41 J. L. & ECON. 305, 311 (1998).
Second, through the adoption of worker’s compensation, payments employees received after
suffering a workplace injury increased. Id.
41

SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 310.

42

Id. at 1277.

43

See generally id.

44

WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 901. In 1915, 41.2 percent of all non self-employed
workers were covered by workers’ compensation statutes. ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON,
LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 2.08 (1997). The percentage of covered
employees increased to 67.4 in 1920, and 75.2 in 1930. Id.
45

WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 902. Statutes providing for “injury” compensation
were often determined to include disability from disease, however, statutes limiting
compensation to “injur[ies] by accident” did not include disability from disease. Id.
46

Id.

47

Id. The National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws was created by
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.
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income; (3) sufficient medical care and rehabilitation services; (4) promotion of
safety; and (5) an effective delivery system.”48 Over time, many states improved
their workers’ compensation statutes at the urging of the National Commission.49
Contemporary state workers’ compensation statutes provide for more expansive
coverage than their predecessors. Currently, about ninety-seven percent of workers
are covered under workers’ compensation statutes.50 In order to be eligible for
workers’ compensation under most state laws, a worker must satisfy the following
elements: suffer a personal injury, resulting from an accident, arising out of and in
the course of employment.51 Although traditionally most diseases were not
compensable because they could not pass the accident test, most states have amended
their workers’ compensation statutes to cover occupational diseases.52
State workers’ compensation statutes provide an array of benefits including
cash53 and wages, medical and rehabilitation expenses, and death benefits for
surviving dependants.54 The compensation provided in each state varies in terms of
the types, levels, and duration of the benefits.55 Employers finance workers’
compensation benefits by purchasing private or state workers’ compensation fund
insurance or by self-insuring.56 The administration of workers’ compensation,
including the payouts of benefits, is usually carried out by a state workers’
compensation agency.57
3. Advantages of the Contemporary Workers’ Compensation System
The primary advantage of the current workers’ compensation system is that it
provides certain recovery for injured workers with a minimal burden of proof.
Compensation is automatic for any personal injury caused on the job as long as it
“ar[ises] out of and in the course of employment.”58 Automatic compensation
48

WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 902.

49

Id. at 903.

50
Id. States vary concerning the percentage of employees that are covered, from only
eighty percent in some states, such as Texas, to 100 percent in other states. Less than 100
percent of coverage occurs because of various exemptions, including employers with a small
number of employees, particular industries, and particular occupations. Id.
51

WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 903.

52

Id. State statutes normally include both an enumerated list of certain occupational
diseases that are compensable and a general category allowing compensation for other
diseases. Id.
53
WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 906. Cash benefits include temporary and permanent
partial and total disability and death benefits to surviving spouses and dependants. Id.
54

LARSON & LARSON, supra note 44, at § 1.01.

55
WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 904. Typically, cash-wage benefits comprise one-half
to two-thirds of the employee’s average weekly salary. Many states impose fee schedules
limiting charges for medical expenses. Id.
56

Id. at 906.

57

Id. at 907.

58

SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 1266.
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provides an assured recovery to workers that is unavailable in tort suits because
workers do not have to prove fault on the part of their employers in order to receive
workers’ compensation benefits.59
The workers’ compensation system incentivizes employers to prevent injuries
from occurring. When employers purchase insurance mandated by workers’
compensation, the insurance premiums are rated.60 Each employer is assigned to a
specific insurance classification and then the employer’s experience is compared to
other companies in the same insurance classification.61 The better the employer’s
rating, i.e., the lower the amount of workers’ compensation it pays out relative to
other companies in its classification, the lower the employer’s insurance premiums,
and consequently, its costs.62 In this way, workers’ compensation encourages
employers to prevent workplace injuries from occurring because the fewer injuries
that occur, the less money the employer will have to pay in insurance premiums.63
4. Disadvantages of the Contemporary Workers’ Compensation System
While the contemporary system encourages employers to improve workplace
safety, thereby reducing payouts and insurance premiums, it fails to fully incentivize
employers to improve safety. Employers will continue paying out-of-pocket
compensation to injured workers and accepting high premiums until such costs
become higher than the cost of preventing injuries through improved safety
measures. Because the main goal of any company is usually profit maximization,64
employers are likely to choose cost savings over worker safety.
Another primary disadvantage of the current workers’ compensation system is
that it does not fully compensate employees for workplace injuries.65 In successful
workers’ compensation actions, workers are not entitled to compensation for all
economic and noneconomic losses suffered.66 Instead, injured workers receive

59

See generally id.

60

WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 907.

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

Id. Evidence is not definitive concerning the effectiveness of workers’ compensation at
improving workplace safety. Id. at 1022. However, according to Willborn, there is a
reasonable basis for agreeing with Butler that experience rating “has had at least some role in
improving workplace safety for large firms.” WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 1022 (quoting
RICHARD J. BUTLER, SAFETY INCENTIVES IN WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, 1995 WORKERS’
COMPENSATION YEAR BOOK I-82, I-87 (John F. Burton, Jr. & Timothy P. Schmidle eds.,
1994)). This conclusion does not extend to smaller firms because most of them are ineligible
for firm experience ratings. WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 1024.
64
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the
Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 431 (2001).
65

Hon. William A. Dreier, Beyond Workers’ Compensation: Workplace Comparative
Fault and Third-Party Claims, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 459 (2003).
66

SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 1266.
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compensation for medical costs and lost wages up to a certain amount.67 Most
statutes also permit compensation for permanent disabilities, determined by a set
benefit schedule.68 Essentially, workers cannot obtain full compensation for their
workplace injuries when their losses do not fall within recoverable categories for
medical costs, lost wages, and permanent disabilities, or when their losses exceed the
ceiling set for recovery.
The workers’ compensation system also perpetuates the information gap that
exists between employers and employees concerning workplace safety. Unlike tort
litigation, workers’ compensation is mostly performed administratively without the
aid of the court system.69 The lengthy process of discovery that occurs in typical tort
litigation does not occur during workers’ compensation proceedings because the only
information required for recovery is the fact that a personal injury occurred on the
job and in the course of employment. Without discovery, employees do not have
access to critical workplace safety information that may otherwise be unavailable.70
Without such critical safety information, employees cannot advocate improved
safety measures within the workplace because they are unaware of both the current
dangers to which they are exposed and the available safety measures that may be
implemented.71
C. Collective Bargaining
Collective bargaining provides a third mechanism for employees to address
workplace safety by serving as a vehicle for obtaining information and a channel for
improving safety.
1. Historically
Congress passed legislation creating a system of collective bargaining to address
the inequality in employee bargaining power. In 1935, Congress passed the Wagner
Act, now known as the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which allows
employee unionization.72 The Act recognized employees’ rights to self-organize, to
67

Id. See also WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 1023 (noting that in order to meet the
adequacy standard set by the National Commission on State Workers’ Compensation Laws, an
employer must provide workers’ compensation benefits that equal only two-thirds of income
lost due to workplace injuries).
68

SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 1266.

69

Workerscompensation.com, Frequently Asked Questions, General Information Section
A, http://www.workerscompensation.com/federal (last visited Feb. 14, 2005).
70
Dan Ross, supra note 1. In the case of Dan Ross, not until his wife filed suit and the trial
entered discovery was it revealed that the chemical industry had known and concealed the
dangers of its products for decades. But see FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 8, at 205
(contending that under workers’ compensation, workers have a much greater incentive than
under the tort system to report workplace accidents because all workplace accidents are
potentially compensable). When more workplace accidents are reported, this increases
inspectors’ awareness of safety issues at the employer’s workplace. Id.
71

A full discussion of the unknown risks to which workers are exposed and the potential
safety measures that could prevent them is provided in the text and endnotes listed herein
under subheading A, titled “Proposed Solution.”
72

SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 251.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005

11

524

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:513

create labor organizations, and to bargain collectively.73 Congress created the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to oversee execution of these rights.74 The
NLRB is responsible for enforcing these employee rights by exercising final
decision-making power over collective bargaining charges filed in its office
concerning violations of specified unfair labor practices.75 The NLRB also oversees
the establishment of unions seeking to create collective bargaining relationships with
their employers.76
In 1947, Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act, in partial response to public
sentiment that the labor movement had been abusing its power.77 The Act left the
core provisions of the NLRA text untouched and added a few sections.78 The Act
mainly served to protect employers’ interests by “prohibit[ing] unions from coercing
or discriminating against employees, from refusing to bargain, and from engaging in
secondary boycotts.”79 The Act also explicitly stated that employees had the right to
refrain from the collective bargaining activities listed within the Act.80
2. The Contemporary Collective Bargaining System
Twelve years after the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress passed the Landrum-Griffin
Act of 1959 and the text of the NLRA has remained essentially the same since its
passage.81 The Landrum-Griffin Act expanded the secondary boycott prohibitions,
regulated extended picketing, and restored voting rights to permanently replaced
economic strikers.82 In 1974, Congress passed healthcare industry amendments to

73

Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527,
1533 (2002). The language of the Wagner Act as amended states: “Employees shall have the
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the
right to refrain from any or all such activities except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of
employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3).”
74

SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 252.

75

Id.

76

Id.

77

MICHAEL C. HARPER ET AL., LABOR LAW, CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 92 (5th ed.
2003).
78

Estlund, supra note 73, at 1533-34.

79

Id. at 1534; Randall Marks, Labor and Antitrust: Striking a Balance Without Balancing,
35 AM. U. L. REV. 699, 711-12 (1986). Secondary boycotts consist of any unilateral union
activity designed to induce one employer to cease doing business with another employer. Id.
80

HARPER ET AL, supra note 77, at 92-93.

81

Estlund, supra note 73, at 1535.

82

HARPER ET AL., supra note 77, at 94.
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the NLRA that extended its reach to nonprofit healthcare institutions.83 Since these
amendments, Congress has passed no other legislation aimed at the NLRA.84
Under the current NLRA, unions form under the administration of the NLRB.85
When a group of employees seeks to attain union status, the NLRB oversees the
determination of what group of employees comprises an appropriate bargaining unit
and whether a majority of the employees want union representation.86 An election is
held and the winning union becomes the exclusive bargaining agent for the defined
group.87 The employer is then barred from bargaining or making agreements with
other employee bargaining units.88
The NLRA imposes an affirmative duty on both employers and unions to bargain
“with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.”89
Management must “seek union participation, consultation, and consent before taking
action” that falls within these areas of mandatory bargaining.90 Safety is a
permissive, not mandatory, bargaining subject. Employers and unions may, but are
not required to bargain on permissive bargaining subjects.91
3. Advantages of the Contemporary Collective Bargaining System
The main advantage of collective bargaining is that the duty to bargain is
intended to facilitate ongoing communication between the workforce and
management in order to address concerns as they arise.92 This communication
includes health and safety concerns.93 Workers bring safety concerns to employers
through their union representatives, who strive to negotiate better safety initiatives
within the company, often times giving concessions in other areas of employment
that are less important to workers.94 In short, workers desiring to prevent workplace
accidents and injuries may be able to obtain such prevention through the process of
collective bargaining.95

83

Id.

84

Id.

85

SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 252.

86

Id.

87

Id. at 253.

88

Id.

89

MATTHEW BENDER, LABOR
Bender(R), By Area of Law.

AND

EMPLOYMENT LAW § 12.01 (2004), LEXIS, Matthew

90
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions
and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 87 (1998).
91

MATTHEW BENDER, supra note 89, at § 13.04.

92

Id. at § 12.05.

93

SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 252.

94

See generally MATTHEW BENDER, supra note 89, at § 12.05 and § 13.04.

95

In addition, a study by Gray and Mendeloff reveals that OSHA may have less of an
impact on reduction of workplace injuries in unionized, rather than non-unionized plants.
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4. Disadvantages of the Contemporary Collective Bargaining System
Unfortunately, the disadvantages outweigh the advantages of collective
bargaining in the context of workplace safety. To begin with, workplace safety is
generally considered a subject of permissive bargaining because employers and
unions may, but are not required, to bargain over safety issues.96 To some workers,
higher wages or increased benefits may be more desirable than enhanced workplace
safety.97 If workplace safety is not an issue that the majority of the workforce wants
to pursue, then the workforce will not gain increased access to safety information
through collective bargaining. Likewise, if the workforce as a whole desires
workplace improvements other than safety, the union will negotiate with employers
concerning these preferred issues, and the opportunity to encourage employers to
increase safety within the workplace is wasted. In addition, even if workers prefer
safety initiatives to other issues or benefits, their demands may be ignored because
employers may legitimately refuse to bargain about nonmandatory bargaining
subjects.98 For this reason, collective bargaining is an unreliable process for ensuring
prevention of workplace injuries.
Not only does collective bargaining fail to ensure prevention of workplace
injuries, but it also fails to provide compensation for injuries. When employers put
up roadblocks to a union’s pursuit of safety initiatives in the workplace, injured
workers are left without recourse through collective bargaining because the NLRA
has no provision for private enforcement.99 Instead, the NLRA is aimed at “illegal
forms of employer opposition.”100 When workers feel that an employer has violated
their rights or the NLRA, they may file a grievance with the NLRB.101 The NLRB’s
regional offices investigate the charge and determine whether to issue a complaint,
which is then heard by Administrative Law Judges on the NLRB.102 After the
hearing, a decision is issued by the NLRB, which seeks to remedy any unfair labor
practices that occurred.103 Workers may receive back pay if they were wrongfully

Wayne B. Gray & John M. Mendeloff, The Differing Effects of OSHA Inspections on
Manufacturing Injuries: 1979-1998, 16 (no date) (on file with author).
96

Anna S. Rominger, Rethinking the Paradigm: Can the Wagner Act and the Labormanagement Cooperation Coexist?, 8 DEPAUL BUS. L .J. 159, 163 (1996).
97
See generally Daniel R. Fischel, Labor Markets and Labor Law Compared with Capital
Markets and Corporate Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1061 (1984).
98
MATTHEW BENDER, supra note 89, at § 13.04. If workers are unable to impose their
safety demands through permissive bargaining, they are prohibited from using economic
action, such as a strike, to enforce such demands. Id. This phenomenon is properly put into
words by Finkin: “American workers will not be heard in the workplace unless American
managers want to listen.” Matthew W. Finkin, Bridging the “Representation Gap,” 3 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 391, 415 (2001).
99

Estlund, supra note 73, at 1552.

100

Id. at 1537.

101

HARPER ET AL., supra note 77, at 103.

102

Id.

103

Id.
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discharged, but NLRB decisions do not contemplate providing compensation to
injured workers.104
Another disadvantage of collective bargaining is that it covers only ten percent of
the workforce.105 Although collective bargaining is available to every member of the
workforce, in order to obtain union representation, a group must complete the
process for becoming the company’s sole collective representative.106 Presently,
ninety percent of the workforce is employed in companies where unions are not
preferred.107 These employees thus cannot pursue increased safety through a
collective bargaining process.108
D. The Occupational Safety and Health Act
The first major national attempt to address workplace safety occurred in 1970
with the passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA).109
1. Historically
OSHA established three federal agencies responsible for executing federal policy
in the area of occupational safety and health, covering nearly all private sector
workers.110 First, OSHA created the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
to determine standards, compliance, and violations.111 Second, OSHA established
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health to research and to propose
new safety and health standards.112 Finally, it created the National Advisory
Committee on Occupational Safety and Health to advise the Department of Labor
and Health and Human Services on OSHA.113 Through these agencies, Congress
hoped to carry out the Act’s essential purpose of improving workplace safety.114
2. The Contemporary Application of OSHA
OSHA regulates employers through specific enumerated safety standards and a
‘general duty clause,’ which requires a safe workplace even in the absence of
specific standards.115 OSHA promulgates three types of standards, including interim
104

Estlund, supra note 73, at 1552.

105

Id. at 1546.

106

See generally SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 16.

107

Estlund, supra note 73, at 1546.

108

See generally SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 16.

109

Id. at 1293.

110

WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 1026.

111

Id.

112

Id.

113

Id.

114

U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Health and Safety Administration, at
http://www.osha.gov (2005) (last visited Feb. 7, 2005); WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at
1025. Since its inception, the Act has undergone minimal changes. Id.
115

SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 1295-96.
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standards, which were issued during the first two years of the Act;116 emergency
temporary standards, which can be issued with minimal procedure for up to six
months; and permanent standards, which require a formal procedural process before
being issued.117
OSHA enforces these standards by conducting inspections of workplaces and
issuing citations for violations.118 OSHA conducts inspections pursuant to both
regular inspection programs and employee complaints of violations.119 When
violations are discovered, OSHA can require the employer to eliminate the violation
within a specified period of time or fine the employer anywhere from $0 to $70,000
per violation, depending on the offense and its gravity.120
3. Advantages of the Contemporary OSHA System
Since its passage, OSHA has reduced the number of injuries to workers. From
1970 through the present, workplace fatalities have dropped by over sixty percent
and injuries have dropped by forty percent.121 This reduction has occurred in part
because of the inspections and fines generated by the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration.122 Large fines, sometimes as much as $7,000 per day for
failure to correct violations,123 encourage employers to comply with OSHA
standards. The fact that employers are prohibited from knowing when an inspection
will occur124 provides an incentive for employers to achieve and maintain compliance
on a daily basis, not just during inspections.
Employees are active participants in ensuring that their employers comply with
OSHA standards. When an employee files a request for inspection based on
reasonable grounds for concluding that an imminent danger exists in the workplace,
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration is required to conduct an
inspection.125 The employee is permitted to accompany the OSHA inspector during
116

Considerable controversy erupted when the Act became effective in 1971, causing the
numerous interim standards to be permanently adopted. WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at
1027-28. Of the more than 4,400 standards, 600 were deleted in 1978 and another 153 in
1984. Id. Those interim standards that were not deleted remain in effect, constituting the
majority of the OSHA standards presently in effect. Id.
117

WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 1026-29.

118

Id. at 1031.

119

Id.

120

OSHA Statistics, http://www.osha.gov/as/opa/oshafacts.html (2003) (last visited Jan.
25, 2005). In 2003, OSHA conducted 39,798 federal and 59,290 state inspections, finding
227,637 violations and issuing fines of $153,690,380. Id.
121

Id.

122

Id.

123

Id.

124

WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 1031.

125

SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 1315-16. The imminent danger must be a danger of
which workers are aware, consequently, requested inspections do not protect employees from
dangers of which their employers, but not they, are aware. Id.
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the inspection and bring an action for injunctive relief if she believes that the
Secretary of Labor has improperly elected not to do so.126
In addition to employee participation, OSHA helps prevent injuries to workers in
the chemical industry by setting maximum exposure standards and warning
requirements for harmful substances to which chemical workers may be exposed in
the workplace.127 In 1983, OSHA instituted a Hazard Communication Standard to
ensure employees are advised of hazard information.128 The purpose of the standard
is to inform “workers of the effects of work-related hazardous chemical exposure…
enabl[ing] workers to play a meaningful role in their own health management.”129
Armed with this information, workers may be able to take action to protect
themselves from exposure or choose jobs that entail lower risks of exposure.130
4. Disadvantages of the Contemporary OSHA System
Although OSHA has helped to inform workers of safety risks and reduce
workplace injuries, it is a flawed system.131 OSHA issues standards that provide
employees with safety information, but OSHA’s promulgation of standards lags
behind the present day risks to which workers in the chemical industry are exposed.
Since its inception, OSHA has issued only fifty permanent standards132 and twentyfour substance-specific health regulations.133 With tens of thousands of chemicals
being used in the workplace daily and more than 1000 new chemicals introduced into
the workplace each year, OSHA is ill-equipped to conduct the research necessary to
determine the danger and toxicity levels of every chemical and promulgate the
necessary regulations.134 Moreover, the National Cancer Institute has determined
that for over half of the 110 chemicals it classifies as having or likely to have

126
Id. at 1316. Employee participation in OSHA enforcement also has a downside. First,
the opportunity to accompany an OSHA inspector is typically provided “only to unionized
employees in a plant that has an employee safety representative.” James A. Gross, The Broken
Promises of the National Labor Relations Act and the Occupational Safety and Health Act:
Conflicting Values and Conceptions of Rights and Justice, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 351, 367
(1998). Second, employees often hesitate to report safety problems at their workplaces
because of “exclusion from participation in the inspection process, fear of retaliation, and
unawareness of rights.” Id.
127

Edwards, supra note 27, at 5.

128

Id. (citing Hazard Communication, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1986), effective November
25, 1983).
129

Edwards, supra note 27, at 5, citing 45 Fed. Reg. 53, 281 (1983).

130

See generally Edwards, supra note 27.

131

According to Gray and Mendeloff, the impact of OSHA inspections on reducing
workplace injury rates has “declined substantially over time.” Gray, supra note 95, at 2.
132

WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 1030.

133

Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 6, at 2.

134

Virtual Hospital, A Digital Library of Health Information, Cancer Prevention: What
You Need to Know, Occupational Cancer, http://www.vh.org/adult/patient/cancercenter/
prevention/preventionoccupational.html (last modified April 2001).
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carcinogens, OSHA has either no standards or insufficient standards.135 The National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health has urged OSHA to modify “existing
exposure limitations or promulgate new regulations for over 100 chemicals.”136 As
this evidence and the story of Dan Ross indicate, OSHA is unable to keep pace with
the needs of regulation in the chemical industry to ensure that its standards and
regulations protect workers from exposure risks.137
A lack of resources also prevents OSHA from ensuring that businesses under its
authority comply. As one OSHA administrator noted, “the current law is inadequate
to deal with serious violators, repetitive violators, [and] situations where people are
put at risk day after day.”138 The Occupational Safety and Health Administration is
responsible for ensuring the compliance of over six million entities, but it has less
than 2000 federal inspectors available to conduct inspections.139 In 2003, OSHA
conducted almost 100,000 inspections,140 which accounted for less than two percent
of all of the establishments OSHA must regulate. The disparity between the number
of inspections and the number of covered establishments, coupled with insignificant
fines,141 allows for some companies to maintain substandard workplace safety
conditions with little risk of serious OSHA sanctions.142
135

Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 6, at 2. Another problem arises from the fact that the
cost of compliance with such standards is often much more expensive than the regulatory fines
that are actually imposed, encouraging some companies to rebuff compliance. David Barstow
& Lowell Bergman, Deaths on the Job, Slaps on the Wrist, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2003, at A1
[hereinafter Deaths on the Job].
136

Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 6, at 2.

137

Typically, manufacturing firms have more knowledge concerning the risks of their
products and processes than the government and its administrative agencies. Firms are also
able to gain this information more readily than the government, often through the normal
course of business. Cary Coglianese et al., Seeking Truth for Power: Informational Strategy
and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 286 (2004).
138

MATTHEW BENDER, supra note 89, at § 197.01.

139

David Weil, Assessing OSHA Performance: New Evidence from the Construction
Industry, 20 J. POL’Y & ANALYSIS & MGT. 651 (2001).
140

OSHA Statistics, supra note 120.

141

Gray, supra note 95, at 1. According to Gray and Mendeloff, the penalties imposed for
employer violations are low in comparison to the cost of reducing many workplace hazards.
Id. This occurrence, along with the fact that many workplaces are not inspected, accounts in
part for the decline in OSHA’s impact on workplace injuries during the last 20 years. Id.
142
McWane, Inc. is a prime example of how a company can fall through the cracks of
OSHA enforcement. Since 1995, nine deaths, 4,000 injuries, and 420 OSHA violations have
been recorded at the company. Nancy Ramsey, Television Review: Violations, Fines and
Business as Usual at an Iron Foundry, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2003, at E5. McWane’s federal
health and safety violations number more than its six major competitors combined. David
Barstow & Lowell Bergman, At a Texas Foundry, An Indifference to Life, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,
2003, at A1 [hereinafter At a Texas Foundry]. In 1999, one of McWane’s plants, Tyler Pipe,
was cited by OSHA for “31 instances of inadequate guarding on machines.” Id. By the
following year, 60 percent of the 70 maintenance workers in Tyler Pipe’s north plant had been
injured on the job. Id. These workers were without protective equipment, including aprons,
boots, and safety shields. Id. And, if the workers reported suffering injuries from the
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Another disadvantage of OSHA is that it does not allow for enforcement through
private lawsuits. OSHA provides no compensation and no personal avenue of
recourse to employees who are injured in the workplace. The sole remedy for an
injured worker is to complain to the agency and rely on workers’ compensation for
recovery.143
E. Summary of Efforts to Address Workplace Safety
While tort litigation, workers’ compensation, collective bargaining, and OSHA
all provide incentives for employers to address safety within their workplaces, these
mechanisms still fail to adequately reduce the information gap between employers
and employees and to provide an effective channel for improving workplace safety.
Ideally, tort suits function as a vehicle for obtaining information through discovery,
but because they are difficult to bring, tort suits alone do not significantly reduce the
information gap. Because workers’ compensation systems do not involve any
comparable process of discovery, they do not provide a means for disseminating
safety information to employees. In addition, tort suits and workers’ compensation
systems fail to fully compensate workers injured on the job and to effectively
incentivize employers to improve workplace safety. As I explained previously,
where the risk of tort litigation and higher workers’ compensation ratings do not
outweigh the costs of added safety measures, employers will elect to forego the
added safety. Collective bargaining does not force employers to consider workplace
safety because safety is a permissive bargaining subject that employers can refuse to
discuss. When employers refuse to discuss safety, collective bargaining performs
neither a means for obtaining information nor a channel for improving workplace
safety. Finally, while OSHA sets important standards and rules concerning
workplace safety, inadequate resources prevent OSHA from setting timely standards
in the chemical industry and from enforcing the regulations through inspections and
fines. The end result is that OSHA does not provide timely information on chemical
dangers or compel employers to meet or exceed OSHA standards.
An analysis of tort litigation, workers’ compensation, collective bargaining, and
OSHA reveals that existing mechanisms are not effective in conveying information
to employees and promoting safety. This limitation is particularly true in the
chemical industry where knowledge is key for workers like Dan Ross.144 Unlike a
hazardous conditions of the plant, they were typically subject to discipline. Id. Company
records show that more than 350 workers were subject to discipline after reporting injuries. Id.
The situation at Tyler Pipe exemplifies the fact that ‘the current law is inadequate to deal with
serious violators, repetitive violators, [and] situations where people are put at risk day after
day.’ Deaths on the Job, supra note 134. It is the workers at these companies that are most at
risk of experiencing occupational injuries and illnesses.
143

SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 1319-20.

144

Private manufacturers prefer ignorance to research centered on the negative impact of
their products because this research will negatively affect them. Wendy E. Wagner, Common
Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to Produce Needed Information on Health and
the Environment, 53 DUKE L .J. 1619, 1634-36 (2004). These negative affects include high
out-of-pocket research costs, a lack of market benefits from conducting safety research, and an
absence of certainty concerning what the testing results will indicate. Id. Industries are
reluctant to conduct research or reveal known information concerning the long-term safety
levels of their products or activities, and, they even “lobby against laws requiring them to
share even basic internal information.” Id. at 1637.
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gaping hole on the shop floor, the dangerous propensities of chemicals may not be
obvious to employees.145 In some cases, no one knows the risks of certain
chemicals.146 In others, the chemicals are not adequately labeled. And in still others,
employees are not fully informed of the risks of exposure.
These information gaps can leave employees vulnerable. When chemical
workers do not have timely or complete information on the toxicity of chemicals to
which they are exposed, they are unable to take steps to protect themselves.147
Similarly, without accurate knowledge of the risks to which they are exposed,
employees cannot demand comparable wages, and will assume more risk than they
intend and incur injuries for which they will not be fully compensated.
It is easy for employers to exploit employees in the chemical industry.
Employers may know of certain risks chemicals pose to their employees and fail to
disclose these risks. Employers may also know of certain safety measures that
would protect their employees, but choose not to adopt them.148 This choice is
particularly problematic when the potential protection is only available through the
employers and the only way employees can protect themselves is to resign.

145

See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A (1965).

146

Environmental laws are limited concerning mandatory testing of toxic substances.
Wagner, supra note 144, at 1666-67. Although it has the power to mandate testing for toxic
substances, the Environmental Protection Agency rarely exercises this power, making such
testing typically the exception, rather than the rule. Id. Manufacturers must report the ‘adverse
affects’ of toxic substances that are on the market, but this requirement is not readily enforced.
Id.
147

Edwards, supra note 27, at 10. And even when employees are informed of the risks, the
steps they can take to protect themselves may be limited in comparison to the steps their
employers could take to reduce the risk involved. Id. at 18.
148

Two safety measures chemical companies can utilize include industrial air filtration
systems and biological testing. An industrial air filtration system would directly reduce the
levels of exposure that workers endure. Refinery Self-Cleaning Filters Cut Labor/Disposal
Costs, 15 WORLDWIDE ENERGY, Sept. 2004, available at LEXIS, News, Most Recent Two
Years. Another option is for a chemical company to engage in biological chemical exposure
testing of employees. See Francis H. Miller, Biological Monitoring: The Employer’s
Dilemma, 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 387 (1984). Monitoring employees can potentially uncover
precursors of occupational diseases or reveal the development of diseases. Id. at 389. The
incident rates of occupational diseases among workers can be reduced by removing the worker
from a position where exposure occurs or by lessening the worker’s on-the-job exposure. Id.
Another safety measure chemical companies can employ is a chemical surface exposure
kit. For certain chemicals, such as beryllium, the greatest danger to workers exists from
exposure to the dust emitting from the chemical, rather than exposure to the chemical itself.
David Wichner, Firm Develops Kit to Test for Toxic Beryllium, THE ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Aug.
18, 2004, available at LEXIS, News, Most Recent Two Years. Berylliant Technologies has
developed a simple kit that tests beryllium exposure on surfaces and produces results in under
an hour. Id. Chemical companies may be able to prevent workers from developing serious
chronic diseases from exposure to chemicals like beryllium by implementing the use of a
testing kit comparable to the one developed by Berylliant Technologies.
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III. WORKPLACE SAFETY ADVANCED THROUGH BOARD REPRESENTATION
A. Proposed Solution
There is a need for a better solution to the problem of workplace safety in the
chemical industry;149 a solution that reduces the information gaps that exist between
employers and employees, provides a reliable means of encouraging employers to
improve workplace safety, and adequately compensates workers when they are
injured. The following proposal addresses the first and second prongs of this
suggested solution. The third prong remains an important issue for which a better
solution is also needed; however, this note focuses only on the first and second
prongs because they are particularly important in an industry like the chemical
industry, while the problem of workplace injury compensation applies universally.
In this section of the note, I propose a solution to the problem of information
gaps and inadequate safety measures in the chemical industry. My solution is to
provide a form of employee representation on the board of directors. This
representation will enable chemical workers to gain access to critical safety
information and to use that information to encourage employers to improve safety
measures within the company.150 Likewise, when exposure injuries occur, employee
149
This note focuses on the chemical industry and chemical exposure safety in order to
exemplify the application of an employee representative model in the workplace and its
strengths and weaknesses. This note focuses on workplace safety because it is a critical
employment concern, demonstrated by the passage of OSHA and the establishment of the
workers’ compensation system. This topic is further narrowed to the chemical industry
because chemical exposure risks and injuries are of particular concern in the area of workplace
safety. The dangers chemicals pose are usually discoverable only through scientific research
and testing. Scientific research continually reveals new risks of chemical exposure, even for
chemicals to which workers have already repeatedly been exposed. Employers in the
chemical industry often have more information than their employees concerning the risks of
chemicals to which the employees are exposed. In addition, in many cases, employees can
utilize increased safety measures that would reduce the risks of chemical exposure incurred by
workers. Instituting an employee representative model in the chemical industry to address
safety will help to lessen the information gap existing between employers and their employees
and provide a forum for employees to encourage their employers to implement increased
safety measures.
The employee representative model may have other potential applications outside of the
chemical industry setting. The model is most appropriate in settings where (1) an information
gap exists between employers and their employees with respect to a certain aspect of
employment, and (2) workers stand to benefit when representation will reduce the information
gap and provide workers with a channel for addressing improvements with respect to this
particular aspect of employment. For example, the model could be used in other industries
where safety is also of particular concern to workers. The model could be used in
manufacturing industries where employees are at risk of being injured by the machines they
operate. In addition, the model could also be used in other industries to target employment
issues aside from safety, such as training, that are of particular concern to workers.
150

Edwards, supra note 27, at 18-19.
Employees have relatively poor information about workplace risks and little control
over them. Most workers facing toxic exposures do not understand the risks or the
manner in which their own behavior can affect those risks. Furthermore, because of
the nature of the employer-employee relationship, the worker may have little control
over work practices or the types of materials or safety equipment used in his plant.
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board representatives can bring the issue to the boardrooms, thereby encouraging the
company to take steps to understand how the injury may be prevented in the future.
An important question that arises from this proposal is whether an employee
representative can ever have enough of a voice in the board of directors to initiate
changes to workplace safety. An employee representative is only one of many
directors, holding a minority position on the board. It may be naïve to believe that
one representative would be able to persuade all of the directors on the board to
address particular safety issues or adopt increased safety measures. However, by
raising safety issues not otherwise exposed, the employee representative may force
board members to confront these critical issues. Over time, the repeated voicing of
concern about safety in the workplace could create a change in board culture
concerning how the board views and approaches workplace safety. While not a
panacea, this effect is valuable in the long run for promoting and improving
workplace safety in the chemical industry.
B. Explicit Role of the Employee Representative
Providing employees with representation on the board of directors will give them
increased access to information on the risks to which they are exposed in the
workplace151 and the safety measures their employers could adopt to reduce such
risks.152 Board representation will also equip employees with a means of
encouraging their employers to adopt such safety measures.153 The primary role of
the employee representative will be to: (1) reduce the information gap that exists
between workers and their employers concerning workplace safety and available
safety measures; (2) use that information to encourage employers to implement
safety measures, thereby reducing chemical exposure and injuries, and; (3) use the
boardroom floor for initiating research on improving safety in the workplace.
In this section of the note, I discuss three models for employee representation on
the board of directors. The first and most obvious method is allowing an employee
of the company to serve on the board of directors. The second method is to allow an
employee of the company to serve on the board of directors, but provide him with a
professional consultant on which to rely. The third method is to hire an outside
professional to serve on the board and represent the employees’ safety interests.
C. Employee Representative on the Board of Directors
The first method of employee representation is having an employee of the
company serve on the board of directors.

Moreover, even when hazards are known, workers may have insufficient bargaining
power to obtain wage premiums.
Id.
151
Robert N. Stern, Participation by Representation, Workers on Boards of Directors in
the United States and Abroad, 15 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 396, 406 (1988).
152

Id.

153

EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 105 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds.,

1999).
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1. Advantages of this Model
Employee representation on the board of directors provides workers with a strong
voice that is heard through a formalized process.154 Workers possess far greater
knowledge of the production process than management.155 A worker serving on the
board will be able to bring this information to the boardroom, which will help the
board to make more informed decisions concerning workplace safety. When making
strategic decisions, directors will have the opportunity to consider the concerns of
workers, concerns that are not heard through the traditional collective bargaining
processes or the other avenues I have discussed.156 Through participation on the
board of directors, employees will be able to influence the decisions made by the
firm.157
The flow of information through board representation is two-fold. Not only will
directors gain access to information possessed by workers, but workers will gain
access to critical information possessed by directors and management that normally
does not reach the workforce.158 Because the employee director also works on the
shop floor,159 he will have continuous access to the workforce for disseminating the
information gained through board participation. The workforce will also have easy
access to the directors to communicate its safety concerns. The result is that
employees will gain access to increased information concerning workplace safety
risks and available safety measures and they will be able to use this information to
encourage their employers to improve workplace safety.160 Workers will also use the
information to demand higher wages to compensate for the risks to which they are
exposed.161
When employers improve workplace safety at the insistence of the employee
director, the representation can benefit the workers and their firms. Increased
workplace safety results in fewer occupational injuries and illnesses, and
consequently, reduces the claims for compensation under workers’ compensation or
tort suits.

154

Stephen Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory Management: An Organizational
Failures Analysis, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979, 985 (1998) [hereinafter Privately Ordered].
155

Id.

156

Marleen A. O’Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to
Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 901 (1993) [hereinafter
Human Capital].
157

Steven Bainbridge, Participatory Management within a Theory of the Firm, 21 IOWA J.
CORP. L. 657, 675 (1996) [hereinafter Participatory Management].
158

Id. at 690.

159

Privately Ordered, supra note 154, at 985.

160

Participatory Management, supra note 157, at 690.

161

Id. at 722. Under many theories concerning workplace risks, it is generally thought that
“[w]ithout full knowledge of the hidden but discoverable health risks that result from exposure
to toxic substances, workers cannot be said to have accepted the risks voluntarily.” Edwards,
supra note 27, at 10.
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2. Disadvantages of this Model
Although the employee director model has many advantages, it also has many
disadvantages. Some of these disadvantages arise from the fact that the director is
also an employee. An employee will possess a high level of knowledge concerning
the workforce and operations at the plant level, but he may only be familiar with a
small fraction of the firm’s operation due to the limited scope of his job duties.162
And, because an employee director is primarily hired to perform his shop or plant job
at the firm, he likely has no experience in performing company management
functions. The employee director may not possess the level of sophistication
necessary for forming company policy and making complex corporate decisions.163
A second problem that could arise is alienation.164 Other workers may perceive
the director employee as a member of management and treat her differently than they
treat other co-workers, which could impede the flow of information regarding their
safety and other concerns. This alienation could prevent the worker representative
from effectively performing her functions.
Another disruption will occur in the exchange of information if the worker
representative chooses to act in his own self-interest.165 Providing an employee with
control rights in the company increases the employee’s motivation to use his
newfound authority irresponsibly.166 If the worker believes that concealing certain
information from management and the board is in his self-interest, his restraint may
prevent the board from having the information necessary to make the best corporate
decisions, including safety decisions.167 Conversely, the employee director may take
actions as a board member that benefit him, but are detrimental to his fellow
workers.168 Of course, if the employee representative acts in his own self-interest, he
can easily be replaced by another employee.169

162

Privately Ordered, supra note 154, at 985.

163
LARRY D. SODERQUIST ET AL., CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS:
CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 137 (5th ed. 2001); see also Marleen O’Connor, Employees
and Corporate Governance: United States: Labor’s Role in the American Corporate
Governance Structure, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 97, 100 (2000) [hereinafter Employees
and Corporate Governance]. The employee likely will have no interest in corporate
decisions, such as investment policies, that do not directly impact her working conditions or
benefits. Participatory Management, supra note 157, at 723.
164

Privately Ordered, supra note 154, at 1000.

165

Two types of shirking that may affect the flow of information include negligence and
laziness. Participatory Management, supra note 158, at 682.
166

Privately Ordered, supra note 154, at 1068.

167

See generally id. at 1011.

168

Contractarian corporate analysis assumes that all people are “rationally selfish actors.”
Blair & Stout, supra note 64, at 406. So, while trustworthy behavior does exist, it is always
possible for people to act in their own rational self-interest. Id.
169

See generally MARIANNE JENNINGS, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, 25 KEYS TO CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 24 (2000).
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The duty of loyalty is also a check on any director’s decision to act in his selfinterest.170 As a fiduciary, the director owes certain duties to the company, one of
which is the duty of loyalty.171 The duty of loyalty requires that a director exercise
utmost loyalty to the company’s shareholders.172 When a director has a conflict of
interest, which includes self-interest in the decision or transaction, his actions under
the duty of loyalty are judged by intrinsic fairness.173 Intrinsic fairness allows for the
punishment of directors who use their position to their own personal benefit by
engaging in conflicted transactions that are not entirely fair to the corporation.174
A final problem with having an employee serve on the board of directors is the
potential for conflicts of interest. As a member of the board, the employee owes a
fiduciary obligation to the company on whose board he sits, which includes the
company’s shareholders,175 whose main goal is typically profit maximization.176 The
director also owes an obligation to his fellow workers to adequately represent their
safety concerns and advocate to the board improved workplace safety. These safety
interests may be inconsistent with the shareholders’ goal of profit maximization.177
Fortunately, corporate law provides much flexibility to directors, enabling them “to
take actions that protect other corporate constituencies while reducing the value of
the shareholders’ economic interest in the firm.”178 Therefore, the director
representative has the opportunity to persuade the board to make decisions

170

Id. at 40. Some of the other obligations that arise from directors’ fiduciary duties
include “exercising good business judgment, not seizing an opportunity from the company for
their own profit, [and] watching carefully for conflicts in their work with the board.” Id.
171

SODERQUIST ET AL., supra note 163, at 137.

172

ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 182 (1995).

173

SODERQUIST ET AL., supra note 163, at 137.

174

Id. When a director violates the duty of loyalty, other members of the board, or
shareholders, may file suit against him on the corporation’s behalf. Blair & Stout, supra note
64, at 425.
175

Blair & Stout, supra note 64, at 431-35. Shareholders’ interests are considered
primary; however, directors may also consider the interests of other firm players who have a
residual interest in the firm, including creditors, executives, and workers. The author further
noted that in addition to shareholder’s interests, corporate directors may also consider the
interests of executives, employees, and equity investors as well. Id. at 435.
176

Id. at 431.

177
Loizos Heracleous & Lan Luh Luh, Who Wants to be a Competent Director? An
Evaluation Tool of Director’s Knowledge of Governance Principles and Legal Duties, 2
CORP. GOVERNANCE 17, 20 (2002). The role of employee representatives is to represent their
fellow workers, however, the law requires board members to principally serve shareholders’
interests. Bainbridge, supra note 154, at 725. Bainbridge also provides argument that the
employee conflict of interest problem is overemphasized, because it is no more problematic
than the conflicts faced by outside directors representing other constituencies. Participatory
Management, supra note 157, at 725. In addition, Bainbridge’s article cites Summers, who
asserts that corporate law is well equipped to police conflicts of interest, rather than disallow
them. Id.
178

Blair & Stout, supra note 64, at 428.
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improving workplace safety at the cost of shareholder profits, as long as the firm
remains profitable enough to retain its shareholders.179
D. Consultant to Employee on the Board
Another option for employee board representation is to allow an employee to
serve on the board, but to provide the representative with a professional consultant.
1. Advantages of this Model
The primary advantage of providing a professional consultant to the employee
representative is that it ameliorates the problems created by having an
unsophisticated employee on the board. The worker representative likely has no
experience making complex management decisions and lacks the sophistication
necessary to make such decisions.180 However, a professional consultant will possess
these skills. The professional consultant will be able to advise the employee director
concerning matters of company policy, such as investment decisions, that the
director would otherwise be ill-equipped to decide.181 The consultant can assist the
director in advocating safety issues in the boardroom and advise the director on how
to best encourage the board to make decisions improving workplace safety.
The employee director-consultant model also retains the advantages that the
employee director model encompasses. The employee director-consultant model
engages a formalized process of exchanging information between workers and the
board.182 The worker representative will be able to bring his operations knowledge
and worker safety concerns to the board183 and she will be able to gain access to
safety information from the board.184 As a worker on the shop floor,185 the
representative will have continuous access to the workforce to disseminate this
information and gather information on worker safety concerns. The employee
director will be able to use all of the information gained to encourage the firm to
improve workplace safety,186 fulfilling the purpose of the representation.
179

Id. at 435.

180

According to John Witt’s case study, workers who did not want to partake in
participatory management “often cited lack of managerial expertise as the reason.” Stephen
M. Bainbridge, Corporate Decisionmaking and the Moral Rights of Employees: Participatory
Management and Natural Law, 43 VILL. L. REV. 741, 823 (1998).
181
In Sweden, employees have had a statutory right to board representation since 1973.
Klas Levinson, Employee Representatives on Company Boards in Sweden, 32 INDUS. REL. J.
264 (2001). Klas Levinson conducted a study of this representation and the statutorily created
educational system developed to support it. The study revealed that over half of the employee
board member participants preferred expert counseling as an aid to their representation. Id. at
273.
182

Privately Ordered, supra note 154, at 985.

183

Id.

184

Participatory Management, supra note 157, at 690.

185

Privately Ordered, supra note 154, at 985.

186

It is important to note that even when employees gain critical safety information
through board representation, they many have a limited ability to take steps to reduce the risks
they experience on the job because they likely have little control over the firm’s operational
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2. Disadvantages of this Model
Supplying the employee director with a professional consultant does not resolve
all of the disadvantages that arise from having an employee serve on the board of
directors. Other workers may still see the employee director as a member of
management and alienate him, disrupting the information exchange process.187 In
addition, even with a professional consultant to rely upon, the employee director may
decide to act in his own self-interest.188 A professional consultant does not address
the possibility that the employee will have a conflict between his duty to
shareholders and his focus on safety. The employee director is primarily supposed to
represent the safety interests of the workforce, but the employee also owes a
fiduciary obligation to company shareholders.189 Shareholder interests or profit
maximization may be inconsistent with the safety interests of the workforce,
imposing a conflict of interest problem on the employee director.190
E. Outside Representative on the Board
Hiring an outside board representative is a better model than either the employee
director or employee director-consultant model for providing board representation to
address worker safety interests in the chemical industry.
1. Advantages of this Model
The outside director model has many of the advantages of the employee director
and employee director-consultant models, plus some added advantages. To begin
with, the outside director will serve an important informational and persuasive
purpose. Through ongoing communication with employees in all aspects of the
plant, the director will be able gain valuable knowledge concerning plant operations
and worker safety concerns.191 The director will also collect key safety information
held by the board and top management through board participation, which she can
then communicate to the workforce.192 These exchanges of information will
facilitate the director’s representation of worker’s safety interests, equipping her with
the knowledge necessary to advocate safety initiatives within the firm. As a board
member, the director will be able to use her position to encourage the firm to
implement safety measures that would reduce or eliminate chemical exposure
injuries and illnesses. When the company adopts these increased safety measures,
the director’s representation advances the prevention of chemical exposure injuries
and illnesses.
practices or use of safety equipment. Edwards, supra note 27, at 18. This fact makes it
important that the director representative not only provide workers with safety information
gained through board membership, but also firmly push the company to increase the safety
measures used. Id.
187

Privately Ordered, supra note 154, at 999.

188

Blair & Stout, supra note 64, at 406.

189

Id. at 435.

190

Id. at 431.

191

Privately Ordered, supra note 154, at 985.

192

Participatory Management, supra note 157, at 690.
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Unlike an employee director, the outside director will be able to more fully and
purposely participate in all board decisions, even those not involving wages, benefits
or working conditions.193 The ideal outside director would have safety and worker
representation experience194 and also the skills and expertise to form company policy
and make complex decisions, such as selecting officers, investments, and technology
systems.195
In addition, an outside director196 may receive more respect than an employee
director from other board members who view him as a professional equal. The board
members may scrutinize the outside director with less wariness and more deference
than an employee on the board.197 The board will likely consider the director to have
the skills and qualifications necessary for being a competent member of the board,
capable of fully participating in the myriad of decisions made by the board each year.
Another advantage of hiring an outside director over an employee to represent
worker’s interests involves the self-interest problem. While, as previously explained,
an employee may be tempted to act in his own self-interest once he obtains a
powerful position within the firm, an outside director is less tempted to act in his
own self-interest.198 The director is paid to be a board member and represent
employees’ interests199 and he probably does not have other self-interests relating to
the particular company because his board position is the only position he holds
within the firm.200 In contrast, an employee director may see his position on the
board as less of an opportunity to serve worker safety concerns and more of an
opportunity to secure extra benefits or better circumstances in his non-director
employment position.201 If a hired outside director does choose to act in his own
self-interest, like an employee representative, he can always be replaced.202 Hiring
outside, rather than inside the company, also enables market forces to take affect,
ensuring that the best representative holds the outside director position.203
193

Ruth Barratt & Nada Korac-Kadabadse, Developing Reflexive Corporate Leadership:
The Role of the Non Executive Director, in 2 CORP. GOVERNANCE 3, at 3233 (2002).
194

JENNINGS, supra note 169, at 23-24.

195

Id.

196

An outside director serves on the firm’s board of directors, but has no internal
employment position within the firm. Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a
Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 898, 900
(1996). In contrast, inside directors hold some other employment position within the firm,
usually in a management position. Id.
197

See generally Participatory Management, supra note 157.

198

Id. at 725.

199

Id. Workers assess their representatives mainly on the basis of their labor advocacy. Id.
at 725.
200

See generally JENNINGS, supra note 169.

201

See generally Participatory Management, supra note 157.

202

JENNINGS, supra note 170, at 37.

203

The suggestion of creating a market for a hired employee representative has been
proposed in the union context. Thomas A. Kochan, Reconstructing America’s Social Contract
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Another aspect of board representation that prevents the outside director from
acting in his own self-interest is the fact that, like an employee director, the outside
director owes a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the company on whose board he serves.204
When an outside director engages in a conflicted transaction, including a selfinterested transaction, he may be liable for a breach of the duty of loyalty if his
actions are not entirely fair to the corporation.205
2. Disadvantages of this Model
There are some disadvantages to the outside director model. First, the outside
director model poses an information dissemination problem. Because the director is
not an employee, she has no direct or continuous contact with the workforce.
Without some kind of regular and frequent contact with the workforce, the director
will be unable to gain the knowledge possessed by the workforce. Also, it will be
more difficult for the director to gather information concerning the workers’ safety
concerns and disclose safety information to the workforce acquired through the
director’s board position.
Alienation is another issue of concern in the information exchange process.
Unlike an employee director, the outside director is not a member of the workforce,
making it more likely that the workforce will perceive her as a member of
management.206 If the workforce alienates the director hired to represent its interests,
then it loses the opportunity to express its safety concerns and gain the critical safety
information possessed by management and the board.
In order to overcome the information exchange problem, a formal system of
communication between workers and the outside director representative must be
organized. This system must ensure that workers have an ongoing means of
communicating their operational knowledge, safety concerns, and other interests to
the outside director and that in turn, the director has a means of conveying to
workers important safety information acquired from the firm. The system should be
organized to instill worker confidence in the director’s competence and
trustworthiness. If the workers have confidence in their representative, then they
will feel comfortable being open with him and supporting his counsel, furthering the
information exchange process.
In addition to information exchange, the potential for conflicts of interest is
another factor with the outside director model. The outside director, like an
employee director, is hired to represent worker safety interests, which may be in
conflict with the interests of the firm’s shareholders to whom the director owes
fiduciary duties.207 However, as explained in the employee director model, corporate
directors are allowed to consider the interests of other firm constituencies aside from
in Employment: The Role of Policy, Institutions, and Practices, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 137,
147 (1999). Kochan advocates the creation of a market for full-service unions, which would
provide employees with a complete package of services, including “individual representation
and … representation in corporate governance structures and processes.” Id.
204

SODERQUIST ET AL, supra note 163, at 137.

205

Id.

206

See generally Privately Ordered, supra note 154, at 999.

207

Heracleous & Luh Luh, supra note 177, at 20.
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shareholders.208 Although the board will have to mediate between the safety interests
of employees, other constituencies, and shareholders,209 a director representative on
the board will be able to bring employee safety concerns to the forefront of
constituency considerations. By advocating employee safety concerns through board
representation, hopefully, the director representative will encourage the board to
favor worker interests over the interests of other constituencies.
Another conflict arises from hiring an outside director to represent employee
safety interests; this conflict is the payment of compensation to the director.
Although the director is hired to represent workers of a certain firm, it is the firm,
and not the workers, that pays the director for his services.210 Director compensation
is far from nominal; the average compensation for a board member at one of
America’s 200 largest industrial companies was $68,300 in 1995, according to Pearl,
Meyer & Partners.211 The high level of compensation received by a director
representative may encourage her to disregard employee safety interests in order to
appease the firm and, consequently, to protect her own economic interests. If the
director representative chooses to stifle her representation and advocacy of worker
safety issues, then her representation will fail in its essential purpose.
Perhaps one of the best solutions to the conflicts of interest a director
representative will confront is the extension of fiduciary duties to employees.212
Marleen O’Connor advocates extending director’s fiduciary obligations to
employees.213 In fact, she claims that a precedent for such an extension already
exists.214 This new fiduciary law would force directors to strike an equitable balance
between competing interests of employees and shareholders.215 The new duty would
208

Blair & Stout, supra note 64, at 428.

209

Id. at 436.

210

See generally JENNINGS, supra note 169.
Board members typically receive
compensation for their services in the form of retainers or automatic annual fees; nominal fees
paid for attendance at board and committee meetings; share payments; and incentive or benefit
packages, which may include performance-based stock options, pension and retirement plans,
and deferred compensation plans. Id. at 33-35.
211

Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-Captured Board – The
History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 127, 155 (1996). Directors may also
negotiate lucrative consultation agreements with the companies they serve. Id. at 156. It is
estimated that consultation arrangements can increase a board member’s compensation to well
over $250,000 per year. Id.
212
Employees and Corporate Governance, supra note 163, at 104. O’Connor explains that
the three main advantages workers stand to gain from the extension of fiduciary duties
include: 1) promotion of greater workforce-management cooperation; 2) increased rights to
disclosure about corporate affairs that affect them; and 3) encouragement of “worker
participation in strategic corporate decision making.” Id. at 107.
213

Human Capital, supra note 156, at 958. “When shareholders’ and employees’ interests
directly conflict … studies indicate that directors refrain from expressing their moral
sentiments about employees due to their belief that they have a legal obligation to maximize
shareholder wealth.” Id.
214

Id.

215

Id.
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more formally legitimize the director representative’s promotion of employee safety
interests. This result contrasts with the informal rule allowing, but not requiring,
directors to consider the interests of other constituencies besides shareholders. By
formalizing the consideration of employee interests in the boardroom, the rule may
reduce the outside director’s perceived need for quieting his representation in order
to preserve his economic interests in the firm. Extending fiduciary duties to
employees will also reduce the barriers an employee representative faces as a
minority on the board of directors because it will make all board members
accountable to the interests of employees.
If board member’s fiduciary duties are extended to employees and effective
communication is maintained between the outside director and the workers he
represents, the outside director model provides the most advantageous form of
employee board representation. In addition to having the sophistication and
experience of an outside consultant, the outside director will be able to fully
participate in all board decisions.216 Other board members may treat the outside
director more like a professional equal than they would treat an employee.217
Because the outside director is not otherwise employed by the firm, he will be less
likely than an employee to view his position on the board as an opportunity to serve
his own self-interests.218
IV. CONCLUSION
An analysis of the current methods of addressing workplace safety reveals that a
better approach is needed for the protection of workers like Dan Ross in the chemical
industry. Contemporary compensation systems, which include tort litigation and
workers’ compensation, are inadequate at reducing the employer-employee
information gap, incentivizing employers to prevent workplace injuries, and
compensating employees for injuries. Legislatively introduced programs, which
include collective bargaining and OSHA, provide insufficient means for employees
to secure safety within the workplace.
In response to these failures, I suggest a proposal that makes employees active
participants in improving workplace safety. I contend that having a director who
represents employee safety interests on the board of directors is a viable solution to
the problems of workplace safety in the chemical industry. Employee board
representation will address safety in the chemical industry by reducing the
information gap between employers and employees and by serving as a channel for
improving workplace safety. Addressing workplace safety in the chemical industry
is of particular concern because of the risks of exposure presented by chemicals and
the inability of legislative standards to keep pace with the growing number of new
and existing chemicals handled in the chemical industry each year.
I considered three different methods of providing this representation for workers
in the chemical industry, including an employee representative, and employee
representative aided by a professional consultant, and an outside director
representative. The outside director model emerges as the best form of employee

216

Lin, supra note 196.

217

JENNINGS, supra note 169, at 24.

218

SODERQUIST ET AL, supra note 163, at 137.
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representation, particularly if fiduciary duties are extended to employees. As a
representative of worker safety interests, the outside director will serve as a
facilitator of communication between workers and the board or firm management.
The director will act as a voice on the board for workers and disseminate to workers
critical safety information gained through board participation. The director will use
the information gained through representation to encourage the employer to improve
safety measures within the company. When the company implements safety
measures that reduce the risks of exposure faced by chemical workers, the interests
of workers are heard, more injuries and illnesses caused by chemical exposure are
prevented, and compensation claims for workplace injuries are reduced.
GWEN FORTÉ

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol53/iss3/8

32

